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Abstract 
 
We propose a socially-informed explanation of technology framing, by examining technology 
‘buy-in’: actors’ relative susceptibility to such framing. We draw on the field of critical social 
theory to introduce the 'Logics', a new framework to the IS discipline, that reveals a 
performative relationship between collective framing, power, and affect. The Logics enable 
us to study buy-in, by revealing the differing degrees of affective self-identification that 
underpin and colour social practices, showing their inherently political nature. We exemplify 
the affective, as well as social, politics of buy-in with an account of Unity 3D, a market-
leading game engine which underwent a major repositioning from ‘fringe’ to ‘mainstream’ 
markets. We discuss four poles of affective positioning with which to conceptualize 
technology buy-in. We conclude by highlighting the consequent need for greater political and 
ethical awareness about the framing of IS, proposing a framework for conceptualizing actors’ 
orientations towards, and thus possible buy-in, or resistance, to technology framing. 
Key words: Technology buy-in, technology framing, affective politics, discourse, group 
dynamics, game engine 
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1 Introduction 
In this paper, we argue that affect plays a critical role in social processes associated with the 
design, conceptualization and especially framing of new types of information technologies. In 
so doing, we contribute to the rich existing literature on technology framing by demonstrating 
how people’s susceptibility to the framing, construction and manipulation of IS discourses and 
meaning at group level – already well-established in the literature – is mediated and 
conditioned by their own, affective buy-in to such discourses. The potential significance of our 
argument for IS researchers is that affect is foregrounded as an important medium through 
which political battles over emerging technologies are fought. In this view, affectively-mediated 
struggles can influence the predominance of one technology over another as affective 
vulnerabilities are exploited through the use of targeted discursive strategies intended to 
encourage or discourage buy-in to technology framing.  
 
In drawing attention to the role of affect in technology framing, we connect our argument to 
existing, well-established research on the important role of power and politics in this process, 
especially the role of hierarchical authority, resource power (control over resources) and 
resistance (Markus and Pfeffer 1983; Jasperson et al. 2002). Our own research seeks to 
contribute to this broad field by attending to ‘meaning power’: a less-studied area of IS power 
and politics associated with the construction of meaning (Azad and Faraj 2011) which 
acknowledges the plurality of interests and positions involved in making decisions about the 
meaning and design of technology (Faraj et al. 2004; Winner 1993; Glynn et al. 2000; Woolgar 
et al. 2009; Barrett et al. 2013).  
 
We enrich the current, predominantly rational and cognitive, understanding of ‘meaning power’ 
in technology framing by focusing on how these processes may be intertwined with affect. In 
particular, little is known in IS research about the linkages between affect and the more 
traditionally-studied, rational domain (Thompson, 2012), and less about how and why actors 
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consent to ideological framing (Pignot, 2016a; 2016b) – both arguably important gaps in our 
understanding which we seek to address. Our claim is that affective processes can render 
actors more, or less, receptive towards certain technologies than others, leading to buy-in to 
one frame over other alternatives (Kaplan 2008). Our contribution offers an alternative 
perspective from, for example, Barrett et al.’s (2013) discussion of framing as a struggle for 
“cognitive legitimacy or ‘taken-for-grantedness,’” (ibid. 205) in which ideologically-laden 
discourse has “an essentially cognitive nature” (ibid. 206), as we seek to highlight that affective 
and pre-rational, yet equally socially embedded, processes are also at work in shaping which 
design framing will prevail (see also Avgerou and McGrath 2005). Our paper offers an 
explanation of the mechanisms underlying such processes.  
 
Our explanation builds on existing understandings of “psychosocial” dynamics (Fotaki and 
Kenny, 2014) defined as “collective emotions that link [individual] behavior and structure, as 
well as how these dynamics shape others, people and systems” (Vince, 2018: 15). We 
contribute to, and deepen, our understanding of these dynamics by building on Glynos and 
Howarth’s (2007, 2008b) poststructuralist theoretical framework of Logics of Critical 
Explanation (hereafter, Logics). In illuminating the interplay between affect and political 
identification with discourse, Logics deepens our understanding of how unconscious (affective) 
receptiveness, personal vocabularies of interpretation, and emotive social performance come 
to shape social reality (Gecas, 2008) by predisposing subjects to either accept, or contest, 
ideas with which they may be confronted. So doing, Logics enables us to contribute to and 
enrich the recent conversation about performativity in IS research (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al., 
2014) by showing how subjects’ receptiveness to performances such as technology framing – 
and thus the replication, or contestation, of associated ideologies, practices, and structures - 
may be enabled or constrained by the interplay between these unconscious, biographical, and 
social dimensions. In particular, we extend forwards the temporal ‘window’ within which 
performative framing is typically studied, by showing how performances are located within, and 
shaped by, preconscious, biographical, and social dynamics that may precede, as well as 
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continue throughout, the period of study. In exploring the psychosocial linkages between 
group-level ideologies and individual value-identities, we also blur the line between ‘within-
groups’ and ‘between-groups’ that has traditionally characterized studies of technology 
framing.  
 
Addressing the extensive literature on IS design (e.g. Bergman et al. 2005; Gregor and Jones, 
2007), we have chosen to locate our contribution specifically within the subgenre of technology 
framing, because this is the juncture where performances of buy-in to technological design are 
empirically visible. For space reasons, we therefore refrain from addressing other aspects of 
IS design such as technology acceptance, adoption and implementation (e. g. Zmud and Cox, 
1979; Swanson, 1988; Davis, 1989; Orlikwoski and Gash, 1994; Venkatesh, 2000; Gallivan, 
2001; Koufaris, 2002; Davidson, 2002; Kaplan, 2008). Our focused, rather than broad, 
approach builds on the work of those who have demonstrated the benefits of discussing these 
phenomena separately (Gondo and Amis, 2013; Klein and Sorra, 1996; Lauterbach and 
Mueller, 2014; Pierce and Welbeck, 1977); an in-depth discussion of relationship between 
these phenomena and related literatures lies beyond the scope of this article.  
 
Accordingly, we define ‘buy-in’ as the act of identifying with, and consenting to, the framing 
which characterizes the design of technology. Figure 1 below provides a simplified map of the 
literature that helps to position our work and contribution within the existing debates. Of course, 
the relationship between the phenomena in Figure 1 is much more complex than suggested 
by our linear flowchart and the Figure should be read only as a way to position clearly our 
argument and contribution.  
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Our investigation of buy-in to performative framing of technology addresses the following core 
question: How does affect condition the political dynamics of buy-in to technology framing?  
To respond to this question, we build on the Logics approach (Glynos and Howarth 2007), a 
relatively under-explored ontological contribution to political and social theory, from what is 
known as the ‘Essex School’ of discourse analysis. The Logics approach has made some initial 
inroad in management studies (Cederström & Spicer, 2014; Thompson and Willmott; 2016) 
but to our knowledge it has never been used before in IS research. The Logics approach is 
particularly suitable for studying IS, as it is capable of foregrounding the affective self-
identification that underpins social practices, as well as disclosing their inherently contestable 
nature. 
 
The key argument underpinning the Logics approach and our paper is that actors attribute 
meaning to, and thus are predisposed towards, competing discourses, to the extent that these 
framings appeal to forms of self-identification that are affectively experienced (Glynos and 
Howarth, 2007). In clear terms, how and why both specialists and lay users understand and 
jump on conflicting technological bandwagons is determined by factors that are neither 
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exclusively rational or exclusively individual - and has much to do with socially-inflected notions 
of who they think they are or who they want to be. The Logics approach both exposes and 
accounts for the links between actors’ affective positioning, their receptiveness towards 
framings, and resultant social outcomes; it thus allows us to shed light on the ways in which 
affectivity and prevailing discourses affect competing framings of IS. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We first provide an overview of where framing and politics 
have been addressed within the IS community, and register the limited role granted to affect. 
We connect these perspectives to the areas of group motivations and affective politics, before 
introducing the Logics approach and examining how this framework can help us to reconsider 
the technology framing process. We then illustrate our theorizing with an empirical case 
example showing how the psychosocial dynamics of buy-in enable and constrain the 
technology framing process, via the case of Unity 3D, a market-leading game engine which 
underwent a major repositioning from ‘fringe’ to ‘mainstream’ markets. We conclude by 
discussing the implications of an enhanced awareness of affective politics, such as that offered 
by the Logics approach, for enriching existing debate on the design, acceptance and 
implementation of IS. 
 
2 Framing, group dynamics and affective politics in IS 
We open with an overview about what we know about affective politics in technology framing 
in order to introduce our construct of buy-in. Our main objective is to examine why affect has 
been understudied in IS so far: while studies of IT design have acknowledged the social 
embeddedness of framing practices, few have actually addressed linkages between 
technological framing, group dynamics, and affect in any systematic way (Davidson and Pai, 
2004). Acknowledging this gap leads us to investigate how affect has been studied in IS by 
attending more specifically to the areas of sociopolitical framing of technology and group 
motivations, and connecting these categories to our central notion of affective politics. For 
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space reasons, we streamline in the main text of the literature review those theoretical routes 
which enhance our understanding of technology buy-in, such as the Irvine school studies on 
how politics is incorporated in meaning-making (Kraemer and Dutton, 1979; Danziger et al. 
1982), the Circuits-of-Power approach (Silva and Backhouse, 2003), the Technology 
Acceptance Model (Davis 1989) and the IS literature on affects/emotions/feelings (e. g. 
Affective Response Model, Zhang, 2013); we examine these in some detail in Appendix 1. 
 
2.1 Technology framing as a political and performative process 
In this section, we discuss how researchers have incorporated the role of politics in the framing 
of IS, and then show how acknowledging the socially contested nature of design has led to a 
performative focus on how meanings are framed and contested both within, and between, 
groups.  
 
Frames refer to “definitions of organizational reality that serve as vehicles for understanding 
and action” (Gioia 1986 p. 50). Orlikowski and Gash (1994) use the concept of ‘technological 
frame of reference’ to describe the “assumptions, expectations, and knowledge that members 
use to understand technology in organizations” (Orlikowski and Gash 1994 p. 178). Frames 
apply to a variety of domains, which include the nature of technology, technology strategy, and 
technology in-use (Orlikowski and Gash 1994) but also the capabilities and design of 
technology, the business value of technology and more (Davidson and Pai, 2004). In this 
paper, we focus in particular on the framing of the nature of technology which takes place when 
technology design is not yet black boxed and still open to debate and controversy (Bijker et 
al., 1987; Faraj et al., 2004). Frames and framing are traditionally understood in socio-cognitive 
terms (Orlikowski and Gash 1994; Davidson 2002). According to Walsh (1995) for example, 
framing results from the application of knowledge structures defined as ‘mental template(s) 
that individuals impose on an information environment to give it form and meaning’ (p. 281).  
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Knowledge structures include frames of reference, interpretive schemes, scripts and other 
concepts often derived from Bandura’s (1986) original notion of schemas: template-like 
cognitive frames that actors use to reduce ambiguity in the world. Orlikowski and Gash (1994) 
focus in particular on the notion of ‘incongruence’: the idea that when groups, such as 
developers and users of, say, a database system, share different assumptions about 
information technologies, these differences might cause problems including breakdown in 
communication, disinvestment or social clashes (Zuboff, 1988; Wastell, 1999). While this 
approach considered the conscious and unconscious priming of frames, their activation and 
the speed with which they are accessed (Sherman et al. 1990; Epley and Gilovich, 1999), early 
studies fail to examine their political and affective implications. 
 
This shortcoming was addressed by a group of authors who convincingly argued that 
technology framing should be understood also as a socio-political process (Markus and Bjorn-
Andersen 1987; McLoughlin et al. 2000; Marabelli and Galliers, 2017; Simeonova et al., 2018). 
This group of scholars examined in particular how political framings are enacted through 
narratives and subjective interpretations held by groups (e. g. Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham 
2002). They suggest that different framings underpin and sustain different and at times 
conflicting values. These authors make a distinction between frame inconsistency, when the 
conflict of views takes place within a group of stakeholders; and frame incongruence, when 
the conflict is between the views of relatively homogeneous stakeholder groups. For example, 
Leonardi (2011) found that engineers frame the same technology in different ways in different 
departments, thus displaying frame incongruence. 
 
Mazmanian (2013), on the contrary, discusses how mobile email devices were framed 
differently by two occupational groups. While stakeholders often resolve within-group 
inconsistencies through some form of consensus-building or convergence (Young et al. 2016), 
between-group incongruence gives rise to political manoeuvring and conflicts. For example, 
Barrett et al. (2013) observed the potential dissent that can emerge between various 
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computerization movement entrepreneurs. Suchman (1995) argues that the normative 
legitimacy of a technology is often obtained at the level of a struggle for meaning between 
different groups of stakeholders – and can be viewed as the outcome of processes of 
technology framing and counter-framing (Azad and Faraj 2011). The process is thus inherently 
political.  
 
Studies that focus explicitly on incongruence of frames between groups (Orlikowski and Gash, 
1994) still assume a distinction between frame incongruence and inconsistency: The 
assumption being that stakeholders understand technology designs in a certain way because 
they are part of a specific interest group. On the contrary, in this paper we are interested in the 
process through which actors’ (re)positioning within a group can lead to contradictions between 
groups (Bernardi et al. 2017), enabling a competing frame to contest the hegemony of the 
dominant one. In short, we are interested in the affective links between frame inconsistency 
and frame incongruency, and how this dynamic may shape buy-in. 
 
The foundations for a more blurred distinction between ‘within-’ and ‘between-groups’ have 
been established by IS authors investigating the idea of performative framing (Geels and 
Verhees, 2011; Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014). Rather than focusing on the individual or 
occupational level as is typical in a more cognitively-oriented approach, these researchers 
conceptualize frames and frame-making as the active social construction and negotiation of 
meanings through interactive processes of communication. For example, Benford and Snow 
(2000) suggest that a collectively-held perception of a situation is generated via contentious 
framing which is essentially a performative process, born within situated practice, and highly 
emergent and unpredictable. The performative approach further emphasizes that collective 
meaning-making takes place on public stages (e.g. public debates, media, newspapers), and 
might involve various stakeholders including social movements, industry associations, policy 
makers, and special-interest groups who engage in discursive struggles that seek to influence 
collective framings (Geels and Verhees, 2011). Crucially for us, Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 
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(2014) look at projects as actor-networks that enrol and mobilize various IT groups—
managers, technologies, IS developers, methodologies, business cases, users, committees, 
project documents, reports, and others. 
 
From this perspective, political performativity is instantiated in the construction and 
maintenance of networks comprising both human and non-human actors (Callon 1986; Law 
1992): their focus is on how networks of power relations are composed, how they come into 
being, how they compete with other networks, and how they are made more durable over time 
(Latour, 1991). Further, Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. (2014) argue that a performative framing 
renders intelligible the meaning-making, interpretive, and political processes of technology 
project assessments. While partially acknowledging the persuasion that is inherent to 
performative framing when enrolling other actors in the network (Latour, 1996), approaches 
driven by ANT have been accused of downplaying criticality and thereby potentially colluding 
with powerful actors (e.g. Walsham 1997; McLean and Hassard, 2004; Whittle and Spicer, 
2008). ANT also has been traditionally silent on the role of affectivity and emotionality – partly 
as a consequence of its original project to rebalance attention across human and non-human 
actants in social affairs (Latour 2005). Although more recently, ‘affective ANT’ (Sage et al. 
2019) has acknowledged a certain distinctiveness to human agency by foregrounding the role 
of affect in enabling the diffusion of technological bodies, emotions and human passions are 
still viewed as the consequence of technologies which activate them; for Latour, to have a body 
is “to learn to be affected” (2004).  
 
In this paper, we build on this important work on the politicization of framing, and try to offer an 
explanation not only for how – but also for why a particular group’s interpretation comes to 
command more attention: in other words, why some framings become more seductive and 
more powerful than others (Davidson 2006, Kaplan 2008, Steinberg, 1998). To respond to this 
question we need to examine first what we know about the links between motivations and 
collective dynamics that surround buy-in to technology framing.   
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2.2 Group motivations 
Authors who conceptualize IS as a socio-political arena in which various interest groups follow 
their own motivations suggest that institutional, strategic and ideological drives are typically at 
work (e.g. Robey and Boudreau, 1999; Berente and Yoo, 2012). Groups can be driven by 
institutional pressures, i.e., institutionalized values and prescriptions that sustain and legitimize 
their behaviours (Avgerou, 2004; Powell and Colyvas 2008; Thornton et al. 2012). For 
example, authors such as Berente and Yoo (2012) used the concept of institutional logics – 
not to be confused with the Logics approach discussed here – to describe the contextual and 
semantic factors surrounding organization-bound activities. An institutional logic approach 
“emphasizes that actors do act rationally, but that this rationality is embedded in a context of 
goals and taken-for-granted assumptions that are situated within a particular institutional 
context” (Berente and Yoo 2012, p. 378). An example is Orlikowski and Barley’s exploration of 
telecommuting, and the increasing ubiquity of work-related computing, in violating the 
institution of industrial employment which relies on the separation between work and family. 
These authors argue that full-time telecommuting is rare because institutional forces have 
constrained its spread (Orlikowski and Barley, 2001). 
 
A main limitation of the current institutional framing approach is that it implicitly assumes group 
consensus – the idea that individuals within groups, organizations or institutions, respond 
uniformly to the design of an information system – an assumption that may not be borne out in 
reality. The same applies to the dynamic between information systems stakeholders such as 
policy-makers, activists, government agencies, professional and membership organizations 
which may harbour different interests, power and influence and therefore may act differently 
(Pouloudi et al. 2016). The idea of institutional framing thus downplays the conditioning, as 
well as agency, of local actors: their unique interests, personal incentives and motivation. As 
a result, studies may downplay the agency of disruptive actors such as ‘technical champions’ 
in delivering large-scale technology programs, and acting as drivers of institutional change 
(Currie and Guah, 2007). They also background the presence of less institutionally legitimate 
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aspirations derived from alternative group memberships – a phenomenon exacerbated by the 
boundary-less nature of online forms of organizing and their resulting overlapping 
memberships (Wang et al., 2013).  
 
The development of strategies for acquiring or preserving key resources has been identified 
as another critical motivation driving group decisions towards framing concerns. Kaplan (2008) 
shows how skilled social actors develop cognitive frames to persuade others that what is 
proposed is in their best interests; accordingly, corporate sense making typically involves the 
skillful use of affectively-charged metaphors, catchphrases, slogans and stories (Cornelissen 
et al, 2012; Fairhurst, 2010). For example, strategic and institutional actors typically use 
flattering idioms, images and metaphors to mobilize political backing and rally stakeholders 
behind their organizing visions (Ellingsen and Monteiro, 2008). Similarly, framing tactics, 
skilled rhetorics, and discursive ability are often able to colour the interpretations of an 
audience – to the point of blinding them to alternative options (Maitlis and Lawrence, 2007). 
That said, some authors have highlighted the risk of casting organizational members as 
passive respondents to managers’ speech and sense making, calling for more balanced 
configurations which do not privilege the act of the speaker over the listener, by acknowledging 
cultural and possibly less conscious motivations which are not exclusively institutional or driven 
by strategic interests (Chreim, 2006). 
 
Finally, groups are also driven by ideological motivations. Ideology is understood here as a set 
of discursive, symbolic and material practices through which meaning on how the world is and 
ought to be “serves to sustain relations of domination” (Thompson 1984, p. 146 in 
Constantinides and Barrett, 2014 p. 4). Boland and Tenkasi’s (1995) concepts of perspective 
making, perspective taking, and perspective shaping illuminated the sensemaking activities of 
individuals situated within communities of knowing, highlighting the importance of narrative in 
this process (e.g. 1995: 357). Robey and Markus (1984) argue that system design often entails 
a strong ideological dimension that symbolizes rationality, regardless of the rationality of the 
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technology itself. In this view, the use of state-of-the-art technologies and ‘corporate cybernetic 
ideology’ (Meyer 1982 p. 54) holds symbolic value beyond mere utility, and signals to 
employees and clients that the organization favors efficient and progressive management. In 
other cases, technology symbolizes professionalism, a characterization that can render it more 
affectively desirable (e.g. a source of pride and prestige for those who have access), excluding 
serious opposition by ensuring long-term commitment to it (Prasad 1993). 
 
For Mingers and Walsham (2010), some of the political questions around IS involve a kind of 
rationality which extends beyond the sole bargaining of interests and institutional relations and 
truly acknowledges ideological differences – the contrast between purist proponents of the 
“free software movement” and advocates of the “private–collective” model, i.e. collective action 
supported with private investment (Elliott and Scacchi 2008) being a clear example. Building 
on this approach, Barrett et al. (2013) propose an ideological framing approach to make sense 
of the politics which shape the development of information systems. The authors describe such 
framing as rhetorics that serve ideological goals: for instance, the open source movement 
claims that involving collective knowledge in the production of technology results in higher 
quality software, and a better society – rhetorics that supported technology diffusion through 
the widespread success of Linux. 
 
Our argument here is that all three motivations need to be taken into consideration at the same 
time in order to understand peoples’ buy-in to a specific technology. In our view, affectively-
driven ideological motivations complement and integrate institutional and strategic ones. Our 
aim here is to deepen these studies of ideological motivation, by explaining why some frames 
“make it” (Sahlin and Wedlin 2008 p. 221), while others do not. Accordingly, in the next section, 
we suggest that a fuller understanding of collective framing of technology requires a closer 
look within the IS community at the political operation of affect.  
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2.3 Towards an understanding of affective politics in IS 
In this section, we focus specifically on work to date on the relationship between affect  and 
technology framing, a dynamic that remains largely unexplored in IS (see Appendix 1). We use 
the term ‘affective politics’ to encapsulate the essential contestability of technology discourse 
and associated framing – and the way in which actors’ propensity to contest, or to accept, a 
particular framing is moderated by affect. In spite of increasing evidence that affect and 
emotions play a major role in the operation and use of digital media (Karatzogianni and 
Kuntsman, 2012) relatively few authors have addressed the issue of affect and framing of 
technology at the individual-collective level. Those authors who have attempted such a focus  
have adopted one of three approaches.  
 
A first group of authors addresses the inter-linkages between affect and cognitive framing from 
a phenomenological perspective (e.g. Boland 1985; Zuboff 1988; Brigham and Introna 2006; 
Introna and Whittaker 2003; Wynn, et al. 2002; Ciborra 2006; Thompson 2012). For example, 
Faÿ et al. (2010) sheds light on the co-existence of two distinct but intertwined modalities of 
perception. The first is ‘seeing’ or perceiving objects and phenomena in an abstract, rational 
and rather distant way; the second is affectivity or ‘embodied affectedness’ which leaves no 
distance between us and our affective perceptions. For these authors, embodied affectedness 
and cognition (Mingers 2001) work together with cognitive framing (through numbers, culture, 
language etc.) to predispose us in particular ways of which we may remain unaware towards 
phenomena with which we are confronted, including new technologies. An example is 
Thompson’s (2012) ‘biographical’ affect: actors’ affective self-identification, and social 
positioning in the present, resulting from their unique historical exposure to forms of social 
framing, which in turn conditions their sub-conscious motivations towards information systems. 
 
A second group explores the linkages between affect and cognitive framing using a 
psychodynamic approach, which addresses the dynamic relations between conscious and 
unconscious motivation (e. g. Hirschhorn 1988; Wastell and Newman 1993; Wastell 1996; 
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1999). In this view, social defenses and protection from anxiety typically manifest themselves 
through the fantasy of self-aggrandizement (users’ belief in ‘autonomy’); they may also appear 
through fantasy that attributes methodology with fetishistic appeal – deriving superficial comfort 
from addressing ‘the letter’ rather than ‘the spirit’ of tackling deeper problems (Wastell, 1996). 
For Wastell (1999) affect is thus centrally important to understanding resistance to IS 
development and associated withdrawal of social engagement through the construct of 
emotional resistance which links the notion of affect, politics and power.  
 
Such a view is central also to the third approach, inspired by the Foucauldian perspective on 
IS (e.g. Bloomfield et al. 1997; Silva and Backhouse, 2003; Willcocks 2004; Avgerou and 
McGrath 2005; Doolin 2004; McGrath 2006; Avgerou and McGrath 2007). This approach 
blends rationality and power through the formation of competing ‘regimes of truth’ (Foucault 
1979) and acknowledges the authoritative character of much technical-rational framing about 
IS. However, it suggests that while groups seem to adopt resource-seeking strategies, power 
also operates unconsciously in their routine and daily actions: groups uncritically accept social 
control and auto-regulate themselves (Coombs et al. 1992). From this perspective, power is 
not the capacity of an individual agent but results instead from the circulation of discourse and 
disciplinary techniques (Silva and Backhouse, 2003). Individuals’ problematization is possible 
but it manifests as the rejection of the “aesthetics of their existence” rather than open 
resistance (Avgerou and McGrath, 2007, p. 300). 
 
For example, Avgerou and McGrath (2005) analyze the failure of the London Ambulance 
Service Computer Aided Dispatch – an innovative system which automated the management 
of the London Ambulance Service’s emergency call function and was rejected by participants 
(e. g. sabotaged) who discharged their frustration when using it. Central to Avgerou and 
McGrath’s (2005) account is the techno-managerial ‘regime of truth’ and its focus on 
administrative efficiency – a focus that ignored other important dimensions of IS, such as the 
emotionally-charged behaviors of the participants. In sum, the Foucauldian approach is helpful 
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in addressing how peoples’ receptiveness towards a certain technology requires their consent 
to a specific ‘regime of truth’ (Foucault, 1991: 73), whose disciplinary power reaches the most 
intimate spaces of the subject, and may trigger forms of resistance.  
Table 1 below summarizes our review of the literature on technology framing, collective 
motivations, and affective politics:  
Table 1. Literature review of technology framing, collective motivations, and affective 
politics 
 
Key insights  Research Gaps Research stream Example 
article  
Theoretical focus 
& core concepts  
Sociopolitical 
framing  
Buy-in is the 
outcome of a 
dynamic of 
framing and 
counter-framing  
 
Framings are 
constructed politically 
in the course of 
actions but we lack an 
approach that 
foreground the place 
of affect in this 
performative process. 
Socio-cognitive  
 
 
 
Socio-political 
 
 
 
Actor-network   
 
Orlikowski 
and Gash 
(1994) 
 
Mcloughin 
et al. (2000) 
 
 
Cecez-
Kecmanovic 
et al. (2014) 
Cognition and 
micro-level sense 
making 
 
Political process 
perspective and 
‘socio-technical 
configurations’ 
Actor-network 
theory and 
‘Performative 
framing’  
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Group 
Motivations 
Symbolic 
motivations 
such as 
ideology and 
rituals are 
closely 
intertwined with 
the framing 
process 
 
Existing views 
downplay non-
institutional and non-
strategic motivations. 
The notion of affect 
builds on, but enrich, 
ideological framings, 
by surfacing its ethical 
dimension. 
 
Strategic  
 
 
 
Institutional  
 
 
 
Ideological 
 
 
Kaplan 
(2008) 
 
 
Berente and 
Yoo (2012) 
 
 
Barrett et al. 
(2013) 
 
 
Strategy as 
practice and 
‘framing contest’ 
 
Institutional 
motivations and 
‘louse coupling’   
 
Rhetorical 
approach and 
‘Ideological 
framing’  
 
Affective 
politics 
Affect is not 
only the 
outcome but 
also the medium 
through which 
an ideological 
framing prevails 
over others 
 
Actors are still 
described as 
somewhat passive 
containers of affects, 
rather than co-
producer of 
organizational power. 
 
Psychodynamic 
 
 
 
Phenomenological 
  
 
 
Foucauldian   
 
Wastell 
(1996) 
 
 
Faÿ et al. 
(2010) 
 
 
Avgerou 
and 
McGrath 
(2007) 
 
 
Psychodynamics 
and ‘social 
defenses’  
 
Henry’s 
phenomenology 
and ‘living praxis’ 
 
Foucault’s theory 
of sexuality and 
‘ethical 
problematization’ 
(2007, p. 299) 
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The literature review illustrates that affect is increasingly granted an explanatory role in 
processes of accepting or resisting the framing of technology (see also Brave and Nass 2003). 
Technology buy-in implies that affect as an agential force may lead actors to identify with some 
framings of technology, and to de-identify with others – often subconsciously and thus 
unacknowledged either by themselves or by researchers. Our review also exposes the insight 
that while existing studies acknowledge that framings are generated in technology design, few 
have actually connected the areas of socio-political framing, group motivations, and affective 
politics in any systematic way. This paper takes an initial step in engaging with these issues, 
by showing how technology designers themselves may be affectively invested in particular 
self-identifications that render them more, or less, susceptible to technology framing. In turn, 
this enables us to shed light on the affective politics underlying buy-in to particular framings of 
IS, by demonstrating how affect may be considered both medium and outcome of IS practices. 
This is important because without paying the necessary attention to the psychosocial 
dimension of this phenomenon, both researchers and practitioners risk approaching 
technology framing in ways that are at best inaccurate and at worst naively optimistic about 
the straightforwardness with which this may be accomplished, with serious consequences for 
organizations. In order to accomplish this agenda, we require a conceptual framework capable 
of foregrounding the connection of framing and power via the medium of affect: a lens based 
within an affect-based ontology of practice. We now introduce the Logics theoretical approach. 
 
3 Affect as medium of practice: Introducing the Logics 
3.1 Conceptualizing affect, meaning-making and power 
We propose an affect-based ontology of practice which captures those aspects of a practice 
which ‘make it tick’, and offers an explanation of how such aspects enable a practice to 
reproduce or transform itself (Glynos and Howarth, 2007). Such an ontology arguably offers 
an important tool for uncovering and studying the politics of affect in IS. This is because it 
provides an appreciation of how actors’ affective identifications and dis-identifications are 
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immanently shaped by the symbolic ordering of the power relations in which they are 
(historically) immersed. Within this framework, affect (see Brief and Weiss 2002; Fineman 
1993; Schmidt and Gibson 2010; Simpson and Marshall 2010; Voronov and Vince 2012) is 
conceptualized as being socially embedded rather than subjective (e.g. Thrift, 2000; Chia and 
MacKay 2007). In common with Thompson and Willmott (2016), our concern with affect thus 
is more ‘psychosocial’ than ‘psychological’, the latter being typically concerned with extracting 
individual affective states (specific moods and emotions) from their social context. By 
‘psychosocial’, we mean that we seek to uncover the causal relationship between the political 
mobilization of affect and social outcomes. Our focus is thus on affective processes of 
subjectification through collective emotions that link behaviors and structure, as well as on how 
these dynamics shape people and systems.  
 
In studying the way in which affect may act as a medium, as well as an outcome, of meaning-
making in practice, we follow the tradition of Laclau and Mouffe’s ‘Essex School’ of discourse 
analysis (Marchart 2007). Authors in this tradition argue that our contact with reality is 
necessarily constituted through, and mediated by, a basic ‘grammar’. This grammar, which 
they call discourse, “is largely unconscious…so the task of the discourse analyst is to explore 
the immanent grammars which underlie all kinds of meaningful intervention” (Laclau and 
Bhaskar 1998 p. 9). In this school of thought, the discursive frames and power relations that 
we can see at the ‘ontic’, observable level of unfolding practice are constituted temporarily from 
an underlying, ‘ontological’ universe of discursive possibilities of seeing, feeling and doing, 
possibilities that are only partially visible1 (Laclau and Mouffe 1985; Thompson and Willmott 
2016; Hoefer and Green 2016).  Accordingly, our purpose here is to explore the affective 
operation of this unconscious, immanent grammar on IS practices, and thus to further the 
investigation of affect’s mediating action on social meaning-making and power relations. In 
                                                 
1 Glynos and Howarth distinguish between ontic and ontological as follows: “In Being and Time Heidegger 
argues that an ontical enquiry focuses on particular types of objects and entities that are located within a 
particular domain or ‘region’ of phenomena, whereas an ontological enquiry concerns the categorical 
preconditions for such objects and their investigation” (2007: 108). 
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turn, gaining a full understanding of technology framing requires some attempt to expose and 
comment upon these discursive possibilities, as well as on their relationship with more 
empirically-visible dimensions of unfolding social practice. 
 
To assist in rendering this unconscious, immanent discourse somewhat more visible, we draw 
in particular on Glynos and Howarth’s (2007, 2008b) Logics approach. Developed from within 
the ‘Essex School’, Logics enables researchers to relate what happens in the sphere of 
concrete, specific and visible social conduct at the ‘ontic’ level with what may be taking place 
at the underlying, deeper and less visible ‘ontological’ level where affect operates. Crucially, 
the approach allows researchers to comment on the dialogue between ontic and ontological 
(in simplified formulation, observable vs. unconscious) levels and to examine the social 
consequences of the relationship between the two. The Logics approach has been translated 
into management studies by Thompson and Willmott (2016) but to our knowledge we are the 
first to propose its use in IS. 
 
Logics thus appears an ideal framework within which to understand the interplay between 
visible attempts to frame technology in a particular way at the discursive, ontic level, with actors’ 
ontological, invisible and affectively-located predispositions to passively reproduce, or to 
actively defend, or challenge, such framing. In formulating Logics, Glynos and Howarth are 
informed by Laclau, for whom the state of things, the extant power relations and the 
preservation of the status quo depends in part on the extent to which actors continue to self-
identify – or not – with its associated discursive practices. Accordingly, there is always a ‘trace 
of contingency within the structure’ (Laclau 1993, p. 435). The notion of contingency, the idea 
that ‘the way things are is never a ‘done deal’ and things could be different’, is crucial as it 
enables us to highlight the constructed, precarious and political character of social objectivity 
– such as a particular framing of technology. The ongoing and always provisional processes 
of affective identification with a practice, however, occur within the ontological (deep and 
unconscious) dimension of a practice – a dimension that usually remains invisible to actors 
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and researchers but which comes to affect their response to discursive attempts at framing 
something in a particular way. Such alternative possibilities – and thus the contingency of 
apparently stable structures such as technology frames on our continuing acceptance of them 
- are usually invisible, since such contingency is usually masked by the ‘status quo’: the 
prevailing configuration of power relations in the ontic (empirically-visible) dimension. 
 
3.2 The Logics framework 
In setting out their Logics framework, Glynos and Howarth (2008b) (see also Clarke 2011; 
Ekman 2013; Holtzman 2013; Thompson and Willmott 2016) explain this unfolding relationship 
between ontic (visible/discursive) and ontological (invisible/affective) dimensions of unfolding 
social reality. In a nutshell, the Logics are threefold: social (reproduction) logics act to 
normalize and preserve the status quo. Political logics mitigate against social logics by 
questioning them, or by proposing alternative practices that challenge their taken-for-granted 
status. Crucially, fantasmatic logics mediate between these two by supplying the affective 
motivation through which actors are moved either to reproduce social logics (and associated 
discourses), or to subscribe to political logics (and associated discourses) that challenge the 
status quo.  
 
Fantasmatic logics are underpinned by a psychoanalytic recognition of the importance of 
actors’ powerful processes of self-identification, in which they may be prepared, unconsciously, 
to gloss over, or overlook entirely, alternative or contrasting possibilities that threaten idealized 
self-images or projections. Fantasmatic logics thus add a second dimension to power relations 
besides the social reproduction vs. contestation dimension mentioned above. This has to do 
with awareness of alternatives and the ways individuals experience and react to contingency. 
Glynos and Howarth (2008) suggest that Fantasmatic logics operate between two extreme 
poles that they name as the ‘ideological’ (unquestioning conformity) and ‘ethical’ (skeptical) 
modes of engagement. An ideological mode of engagement refers to the tendency of subjects 
to be carried away by and succumb to ‘competing hyper-intense fantasies’ (Glynos, 2008: 291); 
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whereas an ethical mode of engagement entails a strong sceptical orientation whereby ‘a 
subject [is] struggling with her or his tendency to fantasize at all’. Closer to the ethical pole, an 
individual thus become more fully aware of alternatives framings, recognizes ‘the contingency 
of identifications and resists ‘buying in’ to them’ (Thompson and Willmott 2016, p. 489). 
 
Together, the Logics provide an analytical framework with which to discuss the unfolding 
relationship between affect, meaning-making and power relations – and which, indeed, reveals 
these as dimensions of a single phenomenon. The four analytical dimensions of the framework 
(social, political, ideological and ethical) can be placed within a quadrant, as shown in Figure 
2 below: 
 
Figure 2 proposes several possible configurations of affect, meaning-making and power with 
associated social outcomes, aligned along two axes. The most important of these for our 
discussion is the horizontal axis, which charts the extent to which actors, when identifying with 
a particular discourse on technology, are impelled by an affective over-investment which leads 
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them to ignore or gloss over alternatives, or by contrast remain detached and open to these 
alternatives.  
 
We now can conjecture about how these four poles (socio-ideological; socio-ethical; politico-
ideological and politico-ethical) are able to inform and deepen existing analyses of the  framing, 
and conceptualization, of IS. Actors’ discourse and actions are mediated by their affective 
predispositions, and operate in the ontic (visible) dimension. Thus, on the right-hand side of 
Figure 2, actors’ judgement is less clouded by affective identification with existing discursive 
power relations; they are thus more ethically aware that their identifications are contingent on 
their continued support, and that they could challenge prevailing power relations should they 
so wish. Following Lacanian psychoanalysis, this kind of open stance can be qualified as 
ethical because it renders possible a different relation to the object of affective identification 
(fantasy), one which is not overinvested but detached. By taking some distance from objects 
of affective identification, subjects are more attentive to the ambivalence which may enable 
alternative readings. Ethical awareness thus entails a ‘genuine openness to contingency’ 
(Glynos 2008a, p. 16), a recognition of the fundamentally political origins of a practice. This 
renders subjects aware of other possibilities - and thus they are likely to be more skeptical of 
any one particular proposition.  
 
This definition of ethics differs from the normative (or mainstream) approach2 in IS. Ethics is 
understood here as having to with the way subjects relate to norms rather than the content of 
the norms governing practices (‘critical ethics’: see e. g. Critchley, 1999; Robinson, 1999; 
Rainsford and Woods, 1999 for a discussion). Thus, on the left-hand side of Figure 2, actors 
                                                 
2 From our perspective, it is crucial to distinguish computer ethics from the mainstream use of the 
notion in IS (i. e. the rationalist prescriptions and their encapsulation in professional codes of ethics). 
To us, ethics is linked to the practice of critique by revealing points of social contestation and possible 
reversal, which we have called openness to alternatives: "An ethical decision, in other words, is one 
which is by definition impure, impossible even. An ethical decision requires that something escape its 
purview, requires the subjective acknowledgement that someone or something somewhere, will be 
adversely affected. In this view, every ethical decision is accompanied by superegoic doubts and 
feelings of guilt, betraying an unquenchable and infinite responsibility." (Glynos, 2000) 
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are less aware of the underlying contingency, and contestability, of discursive power relations 
with which they may be confronted because they are more self-invested in forms of ideological 
self-identification that cloud their judgement. In turn, the vertical axis of contestation, which 
operates in the empirically-visible, ontic dimension, relates to the power relations themselves. 
At the ‘political’ top of Figure 2, actors have a greater propensity to challenge, or establish, 
new, discursive power relations – and, at the ‘social’ bottom of Figure 2, to reproduce prevailing 
ones. The motivation axis provides us with an insight into how strong and long-lasting this 
propensity to contest is. However affective motivation is not visible; it is the resulting course of 
action which is visible and thus belongs in the ontic dimension. 
 
In sum, the Logics framework offers IS researchers a valuable analytical lens that enables a 
greater attentiveness to the contingent interrelationship between affect, meaning-making and 
power in technology framing. In distinguishing between the empirically-visible, cognitively 
amenable ontic dimension and the empirically-invisible, affectively-mediated and cognitively 
unavailable ontological dimension of practice, the Logics are able to help researchers to 
theorize about actors’ affectively-mediated predispositions towards, and thus mode of 
engagement with, unfolding social practice in a more nuanced way that encompasses 
discourse, and its relationship with affect. In the next section, we illustrate these theoretical 
developments with reference to a more detailed empirical example.   
 
4 Applying the Logics: how affect conditioned buy-in to 
technology framing in the case of Unity 3D 
In this section, we illustrate the analytical power and utility of the Logics approach with 
reference to the detailed empirical example of the game engine Unity 3D. The illustrative 
material derives from a fifteen-month study of Unity 3D conducted from September 2012 to 
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December 2013. In the ethnographic study 3 , we observed multiple community events, 
conferences, start-ups’ meetings, and online forums. We also interviewed strategic actors, 
read the specialized press and carefully studied marketing documents and blogs (reference 
omitted to preserve anonymity). Game engines are particularly suitable to illustrate our 
argument as they constitute affective technologies in the sense meant by Hudlicka (2009). 
Game engines are in fact designed to facilitate the development of affect-adaptive and realistic 
games. In our empirical illustration, we discuss a particular game engine: Unity 3D. Details 
about Unity are provided below. Further methodological details of the study, which is used here 
with the sole purpose to support our theoretical argument, are provided in Appendix 2. 
 
4.1 Background: The game engine Unity 3D  
The technological significance of game engines derives from their role as the software 
intermediary that interacts with the hardware of the target platform on which a game will be 
played. The game engine translates digital objects, referred to by game developers as assets, 
from the format in which they were initially developed into code that can be run on the game 
platform (Panourgias et al. 2013). Unity is a platform which enables programmers and artists 
to work together in the same environment. The developers create the logic that runs the game 
by assigning script codes to the 3D models which the artists have created. The tasks of artists 
working with Unity consist of polishing, texturing up and customizing the prefab assets bought 
and sold on the Asset Store. The Asset Store allows the developers to create their game 
without the usual constraints (e.g. time, communication, costs) involved in working with artists: 
they just need to “drag and drop” the prefab assets, which minimizes coding effort. Character 
models, props, materials and textures, landscape painting tools, game creation tools, audio 
effects/music and visual programming solutions are all available from the Asset Store. Figure 
                                                 
3 Theorizing affective ethnography involves the power to act of the researcher and has been described 
as a style of being in the field, being with and becoming-with others (Gherardi, 2018) 
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3, taken from a tutorial presentation at Unite 2013, illustrates an asset, in this case an animated 
character for a role-playing game used for the purpose of the demonstration:  
 
In our study, we examine both the Unity platform’s owners, and their online community of 
developers, which is consistent with our claim that IT framing occurs at both levels. Indeed, 
recent studies have shed light on the role played by participants in online gaming communities 
in contributing to the development of online games (Kjærsgaard and Smith 2014, 
Antonopoulou et al. 2014; Barrett et al. 2016). This contribution needs to be considered in the 
context of a large and important industry. In 2018, there were nearly 2.3 billion male and female 
gamers across the globe, amounting to an industry worth $137.9 billion. Mobile gaming, in 
particular, is in the ascendant, accounting for 91% of the market (source: Newzoo’s 2018 
Global Games Market Report). Computer games are indeed becoming a sport with national 
and international competitions and tournaments, trophies and significant monetary prizes, 
influencers, known and celebrity players, and even ergonomic products for long gaming 
sessions (controllers, chairs, blue-light blocking glasses) etc. 
 
In our illustration, we focus in particular on Unity during a critical period of rapid growth, during 
which its management attempted to leverage affectively-motivated discourses (e.g. the 
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founder’s slogan ‘Let’s democratize game development!’) to position the company as an 
alternative to proprietary game engines, which were largely predominant until the beginning of 
the 2010s. The attempt was largely successful. The market share of Unity has grown rapidly 
since the time of the study. In April 2012, Unity reported 1 million registered developers, 
300,000 of whom used Unity on a regular monthly basis. In April 2015, the number of reported 
registered developers declared by the company reached 4.5 million, with 1 million monthly 
active users (source: online interview with Unity’s CEO on www.venturebeat.com). 
 
Based on the above, our illustration discusses the framing generated by two powerful figures 
from Unity: the Chief Executive Officer and Unity’s UK Director. It exemplifies how different 
affective stances of important developers towards framing strategies condition varying degrees 
of buy-in to such framing – and thus different configurations of power. In particular, we turn to 
Unity’s online community of users to observe the various configurations through which these 
framings are enrolled by game developers. We demonstrate how the characters move through 
different configurations, as foregrounded by our Logics lens. Lastly, we provide a short 
description of what we observed, followed by a brief interpretation in each case, based on an 
examination of the data through the lens of the Logics.  
 
4.2 Logics of the game engine framing: the case of Unity  
As discussed above, normative legitimacy and buy-in can be viewed as the outcome of 
technology framing and counter-framing (Azad and Faraj, 2011), which, from the perspective 
presented here, are underscored by politico-affective dynamics. Recalling the Logics quadrant 
in Figure 2, we make a key distinction between social framing (the logic of status quo) and 
political framing (the logic of contestation and alternative). In the case presented here, Unity 
adopts a political framing to present itself as an alternative to proprietary game engines. 
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4.2.1 Unity’s design: promoting buy-in through a political discursive framing 
The political framing and underlying configuration of affect, power and meaning-making are 
evident first in the performance of CEO David Helgason, in which he seeks to capture and fuel 
the energy of his audience. The following quote is an excerpt from David Helgason’s speech 
at the ‘Unite’ opening in 2013, where he muses rhetorically about the affective appeal which 
drives the industry by sustaining and motivating its engineers: 
Wherever I go anywhere where we have engineers, which is a lot of places now, 
you know, I find people working days and nights and really kind of (silence)... 
spending all the energy they have to solve your problems (...) When we look 
around and talk to people who have been part of the industry much longer than 
we have, everyone agrees that the game industry has never been this healthy 
and bursting with energy and vitamins, so I think it's interesting to kind of ask 
ourselves why all this energy, why is it that things are so, well not just great, they 
are competitive and crazy, but also... really awesome. [Excerpt from the CEO’s 
public speech at Unite] 
In this quote, the CEO reflexively engages with the affective grounding of the community in 
which he plays an influential role (“kind of ask ourselves why all this energy”) and uses 
hyperbolic terms reflecting the affective appeal of Unity (“crazy”, “awesome”). Figure 4 
illustrates the way in which the CEO’s ‘political’ rhetoric was amplified by careful attention to a 
theatrical performance, as was the case with Steve Jobs for instance, that helped cement this 
‘energetic’, ‘democratizing’ positioning in the minds of the audience:  
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Figure 4 shows the CEO describing the emergence of the mobile market, which he claims is 
transforming the gaming industry not only in terms of the platforms on which such games are 
played (e. g. iPads, mobile and consoles), but also in terms of the richness of their content, the 
size of the teams, the product quality and the technical expectations regarding the game 
engine.  
 
Thus, in the words of Unity’s UK Director whose rhetoric appears to mirror the discourse of 
what appears to be a charismatic CEO within this company, mobile game development is 
explicitly contrasted with designing games for consoles: 
Well, indie games, the area of games Unity is best known for… you know you 
have console developers making very large, very large and very complex games 
that run on PlayStation 3 or Xbox, so that’s pretty much the AAA end of the market 
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(…) Very small teams… two one people… could make a game for mobile phones 
by themselves in the bedrooms, and become very, very successful, so that’s far 
more sort of indie, independent game-ended market… they are called indie 
because they are independent they haven’t got a publisher funding them. [Unity’s 
UK director] 
This quote is important as it shows how the indie market is narrated via biographical success 
stories (“could make a game for mobile phones by themselves in the bedrooms”) which 
seductively mobilizes the affect of the community of Unity’s users via an empowering 
discourse. The deployment of the social logic in the above quotation refers to the established 
practice of game design, namely making games for consoles – which is characterized by higher 
standards of professionalism involved in managing the higher risks, skilled graphics designers 
and the higher budgets commonly associated with designing games for consoles. Accordingly, 
the logic relating to console development is considered ‘social’ (in the sense discussed above, 
i.e. reproducing the status quo), insofar as it is established and routinized. Indeed, creating a 
console game involves expectations about securing important actors in the field with ‘very deep 
pockets’. Thus, a second characteristic of the social logic is here the importance of institutions 
(for example, the console game industry is dominated by platforms such as the PC, video 
games consoles and publishers of games), and that a hierarchical order of things presides 
over social actors.  
 
In the above extract, Unity’s UK Director contrasts this social logic with a political logic where 
mobile game development is perceived as far easier, cheaper and more accessible. The 
political framing, i.e. the framing of Unity in terms of being an alternative able to contest the 
status quo, questions the elitism of the game design practice and its particular recognition 
scheme (e.g. AAA games being the most visually appealing), and democratizes game design 
through tablets and mobiles: not everybody has a console, but everybody has a mobile. 
Further, making small games on mobiles (e.g. puzzle or cards games on iPad) does not require 
significant effort and/or financial backing. Consider the following extract where the UK Director 
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describes with soaring rhetoric the notion of democratization as specified in the marketing 
brochure and Unity’s website: 
Democratization just means we want anybody that’s got an idea to make a game, 
to have the tools to make the game. And then you know the players of that game, 
you know the game-playing population in the world, can decide which games 
succeed, and which ones don’t, so it’s not who’s got the best tool, who’s got the 
best ideas, it’s really, anybody who wants to make a game can; that’s my view on 
the product, anybody who wants to make a game could use that tool. When we 
say anybody, literally anybody in the world, we mean anybody that’s got some 
technical skills, some understanding on how games work, could make a game. 
[Unity’s UK director] 
The Director elevates the discussion of universalization by association with the notion of 
democratization, which contrasts with the frivolity usually associated with games. Thus, during 
the interview, we felt that the UK director was trying to persuade and impress us using a 
hyperbolic style in the political dimension, downplaying the technical skills required: ‘literally 
anybody in the world; we mean anybody that’s got some technical skills’.  
 
4.2.2 The fantasmatic logic behind the political framing: discourses of community and 
heroism  
Our discussion above illustrates the fantasmatic logic through which important actors 
exemplified above in the examples of the CEO and the UK Director mobilize discursive 
framings to shape the affective identification of the game designers. Fantasmatic logic supplies 
the affective motivation through which actors may be moved – or otherwise – to subscribe to 
political logic – and manifests itself through desire-based narratives, which we label fantasies 
of community and heroism. Expressions such as ‘the game-playing population in the world’ 
clearly positions the buy-in to the game ecosystem as a form of citizenship or the belonging to 
a community. Metaphorically, Unity’s leaders’ political framing taps the fundamental 
identification and belonging needs of the developers (Bauman, 2013) and is akin to politicians’ 
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affective mobilization of nationalist discourse – a phenomenon well known in the field of IS 
(Von Krogh et al., 2003). 
 
Further, to enhance these narratives, Unity’s leaders rallied strategic actors to their cause, 
such as historical figures and gaming gurus who had devised highly creative games from 
scratch. For example, during our fieldwork at the Unite conference, we attended a keynote 
speech by Richard Garriott de Cayeux – widely acknowledged within this community as a 
charismatic artist, programmer and creative director. Garriott was the creator of the ‘Ultima’ 
series, a very successful role-playing game in the 80s who, in 1997, coined the acronym 
MMORPG (massively multiplayer online role-playing game) and thereby became a very 
influential figure in the field. During his speech, Garriott talked about an imaginary period, re-
invoked and embellished in the retelling, when indie developers were free and prosperous. 
Like nationalist myths (Stavrakakis 2007), the story of the independent developer and the 
reminiscences about the golden age of the independent studios in the 80s were harnessed to 
encourage affectively-driven self-identification by participants with Richard Gariott, with the 
ideal of achieving freedom from the major studios and institutions – and, by association, with 
the image of Unity. 
 
Moreover, this heroic narrative taps into developers’ vulnerability to self-identification with 
promising entrepreneurial discourses. In this scenario, indie developers typically buy into the 
beatific narrative of successful entrepreneurs, with one or two programmers becoming rich by 
developing an app in the intimacy of their ‘bedroom’ on a very small budget. In particular, the 
UK Director tells the story of a programmer who made some tools to help people with some 
2D artwork, which they then sold on the Assets Store, claiming that the programmer had made 
US$300,000 from selling this product. Game designers systematically share success stories 
via blog posts or during socialization rituals, such as the company’s community events and 
online fora. Such stories recall similar legendary narratives, such as that of the creation of HP 
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when Bill Hewlett and Dave Packard built the company’s first product – an audio oscillator – in 
their California garage in 1939 (Poulton 2005). 
 
 
In summary, in this section we discuss the three logics underpinning Unity’s discursive framing, 
which we summarize in Table 2 below. In the next section, we describe how Unity developers’ 
affective reactions to such framing differ from one another, and facilitate different 
Table 2: Summary of the three Logics applied to the framing of Unity 3D 
Logics Platform owners’ framing attempts 
Social Game design for entertainment:  
 use limited to consoles (e.g. Xbox, Wii) 
 design restricted to major studios (e.g. Nintendo, 
Microsoft) 
 diffusion ruled by major publishers  
 institutional accreditation scheme (AAA games) 
Political Democratized game design:  
 use extended to tablets, mobiles, e-learning, serious 
gaming 
 design transferred to small teams, service companies, 
indie developers 
 independent-ended market (i.e. indie developers) 
Fantasmatic 
(affectively-
motivated)  
Desire-based narratives: 
 heroism: heroic-fantasy imaginary (e.g. Ultima); 
successful entrepreneurial stories, freedom in regards to 
institutions 
 community spirit: universality, metaphorical citizenship 
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configurations of power as a result of such differences. In so doing, we show how affect is a 
‘missing variable’ which can generate different power relations from the same discursive 
framing input. 
 
5 Moving across quadrants: How affect conditions developers’ 
buy-in  
In what follows, we will show how the framing dynamic in the case of Unity moves through the 
four poles of the Logics. While strategic leaders used a political framing, followers may accept 
and act ‘politically’ – framing the technology in a new way – or ‘socially’ – protecting or restoring 
the social framing being challenged. Developers in turn have the opportunity to either blindly 
reject the alternative framing (disregarding contingency), or to accept a co-existence between 
various framings, and thereby acknowledge contingency.  
 
5.1 Politico-ideological pole: Ideologically entrenched buy-in to the new framing  
Our field data from the Unity event help to illustrate that affective processes were strongly 
implicated in how developers reacted to the framing of the game engine. Many of the game 
designers off-stage strongly identified  with the ‘heroic’ figures on-stage, demonstrating an 
over-investment in these narratives similar to that of sport supporters or rock fans. Keynote 
speakers received a heated ovation from the overcrowded conference room. This over-
investment, which lead to an enthusiastic buy-in, was also visible in many informal discussions 
during coffee breaks, such as a father who endorsed Unity’s democratizing culture somewhat 
literally by taking pride in his use of the engine to develop games in his spare time for his kids 
(he was not a professional developer). He had chosen, and continued to use, Unity because 
of its legendary reputation for ease of use (although he never managed to finish a game).  
 
Crucially, affect appears as a compelling ‘missing variable’ in explaining the ideological extent 
of the strong self-identification with Richard Garriott’s story, which led game designers to gloss 
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over various alternative critical explanations, which include the fact that Unity was designed 
for mobile games, and might not be the ideal engine to design complex role-playing games. 
For example, in Figure 5 we show a LinkedIn message where the CEO announces his new 
no-cost policy and ‘democratization strategy’ in his efforts to strengthen users’ allegiance to 
the Unity engine. In this example, the developer responds somewhat unreflexively (or with tacit 
complicity) to the news by using a reference to disappointment (‘we shalln’t disappoint you’) 
that is somewhat filial (i. e., worrying about disappointing a moral figure) and somewhat out of 
place in what should be an owner-customer relationship. 
 
Affect also operates at a more biographical level. As illustrated below, designers’ buy-in to 
Unity is linked to their identities, where game designers identify with different professional role-
models, depending on which platform they adopt. On-site discussions with game designers 
reveal that 3D artists self-identified strongly with the entrepreneurial biographical narrative. 
Several of them had quit their jobs in big game studios to focus on assets creation and in 
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conversation with the researcher expressed the belief that success of mobile apps favors the 
emergence of indie developers in small businesses. Typically, Unity’s entrepreneurial narrative 
sustains the figure of the indie developer, with which game designers identify strongly. Thanks 
to the Asset Store, the designer-programmer is empowered, as (s)he potentially ‘doesn’t need’ 
a 3D artist. In the following extract from one of Unity’s online fora, the mobilization of indie 
developers’ affective vulnerability leads a game developer to take pride in using Unity by 
defining himself as a programmer, and by stigmatizing/demonizing the figure of the ‘modder’4. 
Thus, in the words of John5:  
JOHN: Without sources, I don’t see any interest on [sic] UDK (Unreal 
Development Kit), you don’t have the same low level of access as in Unity. Sure, 
Unreal modders will be happy now. But am not a modder, am a game 
programmer. [Unity’s online community] 
UDK is here associated with the Unreal modder, and thereby to the less professional and less 
legitimate role of the bricoleur (in the original exchange modders are called “lowly”). The 
obvious self-identification in this example shows how Unity’s framing seductively reassures 
and secures programmers’ sense of skill and competence. 
 
Later, in the same online thread, John makes his observation more explicit. Claiming to 
acknowledge the perspective of the others, he actually makes fun of it, thus confirming the 
ideological stance which he is adopting: 
JOHN: UDK is just crap, I don't see any professional studio working with UDK. It 
brakes [sic] your workflow, you have to change your coding philosophy and cons 
are greater than pros... I know is fun to play Bioshock (wish by the way was made 
with a heavy sourced modified version of UE3) and say wooow i can make this 
with UDK!!! Nope, that's not true. As someone already pointed out. Making 
                                                 
4 “Modding” refers to the creation and distribution of player-created software extensions to a game (i.e. here 
the first-person shooter game Unreal, from which UDK originated), widely downloaded and used by players. 
5 Names of participants to Unity’s online community have been changed; they have no relationship to names in 
real life.  
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games, sorry MODS with UDK is like reverse engineering all the way, all the way. 
Unity gives you the possibility to make your own editor extension/tools. [Unity’s 
online community] 
The tone is derisory and denigrating (‘crap’, ‘any professional studio’, ‘MODS’). By highlighting 
reverse engineering and mods, John undermines the professional legitimacy of designing with 
UDK. He typically glosses over alternative explanations (‘Nope, that's not true’) and is clearly 
not attuned to contingency. He appears affectively bound to his own discourse in a way that 
manifests an excessive buy-in. 
 
In summary, Unity’s strategic leaders mobilize ‘political’ discourses (the idealization of the indie 
‘free’ developer), which are subsequently endorsed, at a local level, with different degrees of 
enthusiastic buy-in (e. g. the identification with the programmer and demotion of the modder; 
the possibility of making their own editor extension). They do so in order to encourage a form 
of extreme identification and over-investment on the part of developers who, being 
ideologically self-invested, are affectively motivated to gloss over or ignore the existence of 
alternatives, and who overlook the corporate interests by which Unity is – at least in part – 
directed. The effect is that users are positioned in the top left quadrant of our Logics framework 
(see Figure 6) which results in a strong and rather unquestioning buy-in to, but also an active 
championing of, their leaders’ framing of the Unity ecosystem – underpinned by motivations of 
which they may not be focally aware. 
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5.2 Socio-ideological pole: Ideologically entrenched rejection of the new framing  
Other developers may be more passive in their acceptance of the status quo; in so doing they 
resist buying-in into the proposed framing of Unity as a technology that could challenge the 
status quo and so contribute to the reproduction of prevailing power relations by continuing to 
enact existing processes (bottom left quadrant). Thus, others may not feel affectively moved 
by the attempted framing of Unity in the manner of John, above. For example, in the same 
thread of the Unity online forum, Luigi, another designer, contests John’s self-identification 
(with high standards of professionalism), and cannot hide his contempt: 
LUIGI: That’s actually quite a failure and an elitist attitude. You should realize that 
working with mods and UDK is game programming and there is no difference 
between that and modding. I’ve worked in the industry for quite some time now 
and you rarely see any high-level game code in C++ so does that mean that every 
single game you build is modding and not programming? Of course not! [Unity’s 
online community] 
John, the ardent Unity supporter referred to above, at least in this exchange, appears to be 
(affectively) blinded to alternative perspectives. For example, he ignores that 3D artists may 
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typically praise the aesthetic and technical demands of the old regime because of its visual 
quality and thus gloss over, or even contest, the relatively poor quality of graphics in the new 
Unity-based mobile gaming generation. John’s apparent investment in Unity’s framing makes 
no impact on peers such as Luigi, who is himself routinely (affectively) absorbed in replicating 
his taken-for-granted practice of game design, here working with UDK. In fact, some of the 
game developers keep defending UDK’s suitability for designing first-person shooter-type 
games: 
LUIGI: If you want to learn how to build an Unreal Tournament kind of game, 
then the UDK is perfect for that because it even provides the assets of the game, 
so you can go behind the scenes and discover the way they (Epic) did it. If you 
have the team (or excel at being a jack-of-trades) the UDK enables you to take 
advantage of the advanced features that can catapult your Indie project to AAA 
level. [Unity’s online community] 
 
Users of UDK, such as Luigi, lend credence to UDK’s existing institutional accreditation 
scheme, thereby reproducing prevailing power relations. By using a scheme widely known and 
accepted by console games developers, they protect the prevailing institutional order. In 
contrast, Unity’s discourses threaten such users’ existing identification with UDK, producing a 
very different affective reaction. Their continued use of UDK predisposes them to reinforce the 
existing technical frame – and to actively disregard the innovative potential of Unity. In 
response to Unity’s discursive manoeuvres, they position themselves within the 
ideological/social dimension (see Figure 7), emerging as a possible obstacle or ‘barrier’ to the 
irresistible march of Unity (at least from Unity’s perspective): 
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5.3 Socio-ethical pole: Open/conditional (temporary) non buy-in to the new 
framing  
The analysis of Unity’s online community of users reveals that the two leading game engines, 
Unity and its competitors Unreal/UDK, were perceived as reproducing the line of antagonism 
between the (challenged) social logic and the new political logic. UDK was considered as 
having many AAA titles under its belt. It was industry-proven and intended for larger, 
specialized teams and bigger budgets. Unity, conversely, was tailored to the market of mobile 
apps and entrepreneurs who do not necessarily belong to major studios. In other words, the 
success of Unity resulted from its accessibility and ‘no royalties, no fees’ policy. 
 
Yet, not all game designers endorse Unity with the conviction demonstrated above by John. 
While important Unity actors ‘on stage’ proactively offer an alternative way to follow, users ‘off 
stage’ buy into the framing but continue to pay (some) attention to the contingent nature of 
Unity’s increasing dominance. Moving to the bottom right quadrant, UDK developers might be 
well aware that alternative possibilities exist that could successfully challenge the status quo 
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on this issue within his community. For instance, Pierre, a participant in Unity’s online 
community forum, discloses his preference for UDK, yet carefully seeks to establish a fair 
comparison before putting forward his opinion: 
PIERRE: I am sorry but Unity isn’t the best FPS Engine. I think it can look as 
good but UDK has the ability to look better. UDK was designed for FPS whereas 
Unity seems, to me anyway, to be designed for a greater variety. They are both 
equally as great and amazing, I just think it comes down to opinion. As I have 
stated mine. And don't take me for some Unity basher - I love Unity. But let’s face 
it, UDK is a commercial-grade game engine with many AAA titles under its belt. 
It's industry-proven and intended for larger specialized teams and bigger budgets. 
Unity is primarily a casual / web game engine intended for smaller teams. Both 
can make fun games, but it's apples and oranges, and trying to directly compare 
the two feature to feature is unfair to them both. [Unity’s online community] 
In this quote, the developer is concerned with fairness, maintaining a balanced judgment and 
being respectful of the quality of each perspective. He relativizes his own affective stance 
towards UDK’s engine: ‘it comes down to opinion’. He is neither a ‘basher’, over-invested in 
denigrating, nor a fanatic adopter; he defends his opinion in a manner which is attentive to 
contingency. His opinion is, therefore, both strong and consequential: ‘let’s face it’. By 
performing a comparison in balancing the positive and negative features of each, Pierre 
demonstrates his attention to contingency, yet decides not to ‘rock the boat’. It seems to us 
that Pierre is perfectly aware of Unity’s limitations, yet rationally accepts Unity for what it was: 
a cheap and accessible generalist engine. Using the Logics framework, his position can be 
described as socio-ethical (see Figure 8).  As we explain above, ‘ethical’ here refers to 
openness to contingencies and discursive conditions of possibility. In such cases, the actors 
reproduce prevailing power relations, but moderate their buy-in to the Unreal engine, yielding 
a potentially new relation to it. Unlike the two extreme positions described above, locating 
oneself in this affective positioning is likely to generate a possibly temporary non–buy-in, or a 
conditional buy-in, governed by a mix of affective, material and practical considerations. Affect 
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continues to play a critical role, but does not feature as prominently as in the two previous 
cases. 
  
5.4 Politico-ethical pole: Open/conditional buy-in to the new framing  
Finally, it is important to note that the perspective of everybody within the Unity community 
was shaped by their own psychosocial positioning towards discourse, and associated ideology, 
about technology – even as they themselves were shaping and framing this for others.  In this 
example, Unity CEO Helgason assumes a more ethically aware orientation and challenges the 
status quo (what we call here ‘taking a political stance’) in a way which is more attentive to 
contingency and possibilities and less affectively self-invested. This is observable, for example, 
in a press interview by Unity CEO Helgason, who confirms that 2006 was the moment of a shift 
in Unity’s strategic framing:  
We didn't think about mobile until 2006 and then the Nintendo Wii came out, 
which we decided to go to for two reasons. We thought it would be a really open 
platform and it turned out to not be as open as we'd hoped. When they spoke of 
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'indies' they weren't lying, they just had a very different definition of indies than 
we had. [Online interview with Unity’s CEO on www.gamesindustry.biz] 
The CEO is using a more ethical framing to promote the figure of the indie developers and 
induce (and partially seduce) this specific group within Unity’s fold. In so doing, he indirectly 
talks to, and in the process discursively constructs, a specific occupational category: the indie 
developers working in small teams, whom he contrasts with established developers working in 
big firms. He not only targets indie developers’ affective investment in a particular way of 
seeing themselves, but also manifests his awareness of negotiating with alternative positioning 
and underlying interests. He does this by imaginarily occupying the role of a trusting designer 
(‘we thought it would be a really open platform’). However, he progressively contests this social 
logic by attributing an alternative meaning (‘very different definition’) to being indie, re-labelling 
or re-framing their work practice in a way which tends to dismiss traditional game design as a 
closed practice (‘not be as open’), one which is open only to institutionalized developers. 
 
In so doing, Helgason historicizes the strategic turn of his company and his decision to 
differentiate his activity from traditional institutions (Nintendo) and the established formats (Wii) 
of the console market. The euphemism ‘they were not lying’ reveals his awareness of 
negotiating with existing power relations with major actors in the field. Therefore, the CEO 
challenges the prevailing power relationship, yet remains sensitive to the contingency of his 
positioning. In other terms, he carefully weighs the evidence on both sides before choosing to 
challenge Nintendo’s view. He positions himself in the political-ethical quadrant (see Figure 9) 
and invites others to do the same. Ideology is still at work: the attempt to promote allegiance 
to Unity through affective identification with the practice of the indie developer and its 
association with novelty, freedom and democracy is still in operation. However, this manoeuvre 
is tempered by Helgason’s own positioning: his openness to different points of view, his 
acknowledgement of a plurality of options, and the implicit recognition that the position of Unity 
is contingent (what we call above an ethical orientation). Actors occupying this position are still 
likely to endorse Unity, but in a more open, realistic and possibly conditional way. 
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6 Discussion 
In this paper, we argue that affect is both a medium through which political battles over 
emerging technologies are fought, as well as a critical component in promoting buy-in to one 
technological framing over others. Using data from the Unity ecosystem, we have suggested 
that organizational actors’ affective buy-in to specific ideological framing of technology has had 
a strong influence on their relative propensity to jump on the bandwagon of a new emerging 
technology (reciprocally, previous engagements with gaming platforms are also likely to inform 
such ideological framing). In short, the framing of, and buy-in to, Unity 3D were both affectively 
conditioned and promoted through the strategic mobilization of specific ideological discourses, 
as well as the intentional and unintentional exploitation of affective vulnerabilities on the part 
of developers. We say ‘intentionally’ and ‘unintentionally’ because, based on our field work, we 
have exemplified how, for example, Unity’s CEO - an ex-developer himself - was infused with 
the same ideals and entangled in the same web of affective identification within which he 
sought to enrol others.  
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We have argued in particular that the rational institutional discourse surrounding the shift of 
Unity 3D from ‘fringe’ to ‘mainstream’ technology was animated and underpinned by Unity 
developers’ differing affective identifications with the technical possibilities of the newly-
positioned engine, and its association with the affectively-laden notion of freedom and 
nonconformity. Such an acknowledgement holds the clear methodological implication that 
accounts by respondents of institutional dynamics are not to be trusted at face value by 
researcher, as they are likely to include unacknowledged semi/unconscious motivations and 
fantasmatic narratives. Having said that, platform economics and dynamics are much more 
complicated and reducing such a positive market-effect to the power of marketing buzzwords 
or organizing visions would be over-simplistic. It is clear that the dynamics of digital platform 
operations go well beyond the rhetorical framing: our endeavor was to demonstrate that part, 
but not all the answer, lies in the affective contagion and collective dynamics of buy-in which 
trigger the diffusion of the technology within a two-sided market.  
 
As illustrated by the Unity 3D case, the construct of buy-in is especially promising in the context 
of the growth of online, new forms of organizing (Winter et al., 2014), whose communities of 
actors play a pivotal feature in helping to determine whether such ecosystems ‘go mainstream’ 
or not. Furthermore, our framework is especially useful because it problematizes more 
traditional accounts of framing as primarily socio-cognitive and socio-political, by showing very 
explicitly how making the assumption of pre-existing group memberships comprised of more 
or less rational actors might lead to errors in our thinking. In contrast, the Unity case shows 
that group dynamics are the locus of a dialectical and performative movement between 
contingent framings on the one hand, and collective acts of affective buy-in that reinforce or 
transform those contingent framings on the other. Our ‘affective politics’ approach highlights 
the affective dimension that operates behind the institutional (Berente and Yoo, 2012), 
strategic (Kaplan, 2008) or ideological motivations (Barrett et al., 2013). Attentiveness to 
affective politics in technology framing helps to avoid granting too much importance to the role 
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of personal agency (i.e., the influence of strategists over their audience) or institutional 
rationality (i.e. where motivation is linked to institutional pressure rather than more informal 
motivations). While framings may be in opposition (Robey and Boudreau, 1999) the 
fantasmatic logic provides them with the necessary force to prevail and to potentially have 
long-lasting impact. 
 
Through four configurations of the Logics, we thus demonstrate how stakeholders involved in 
a particular technology may differentially respond and position themselves relative to 
technological buy-in on the basis of more than just traditionally-recognised cognitive analysis. 
Affect is thus seen to be involved in identification with/rejection of new technological framings, 
as actors’ orientation towards technology, and resulting power relations, emerges from the 
dialogue between ontic and ontological dimensions, a dialogue that may be informed by other 
factors, including the attraction of alternative framings, previous experience, present historical 
conditions and many others. Indeed, each of our quadrants admits a number of different 
positions and degrees within them, thus suggesting that different ways to solve the tension 
between alternative logics and different personal affective compromises are available to 
actors. Moreover, the framework suggests that the positioning of the actors in the quadrants is 
likely to change over time: ‘conversions’ are a clear example of how framings can suddenly be 
reversed, based on part-affective rather than purely cognitive motivations. 
 
Although the above discussion prevents us from establishing a normative relationship between 
positions in the quadrant and any predictive propensity towards buy-in to a new technology, 
we can hypothesize that different solutions to the ontic-ontological dialogue and the varying 
degrees of hold that fantasmatic logic has on actors’ resulting self-identifications can result in 
them experiencing different orientations towards the new technology (following Glynos and 
Howarth, we have termed ‘fantasmatic’ the logic that supplies the affective motivation to 
reproduce social logics or to challenge these through political orientation). We summarize 
these various configurations of Logics in Figure 10 below. 
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Actors who find themselves affectively located towards the politico-ideological pole, for 
example, are likely to enthusiastically and unreservedly buy-in to the new framing. Indeed, they 
are likely to become fervent supporters and die-hard promoters of what they perceive as a just 
cause, not unlike John in our discussion above. They are also likely to persevere in using the 
technology that, in time, will become intimately associated with how they see themselves. The 
strong ideological nature of this position means that these users are likely to be locked into this 
position by all manner of confirmation biases (Klayman 1995). This in turn will make their 
position affectively entrenched, with the result that change may become difficult and unlikely. 
As sudden and powerfully motivated as such buy-in may be, this kind of early acceptance (or 
adhesion to the hype) also carries with it its own dangers of challenge (as illustrated by Luigi 
in our data), disillusion and frustration (Glynos 2008a). 
 
A similar but symmetrically opposite situation is likely to occur for actors who unconsciously 
reject and resist efforts of affective identification, and who end up occupying positions in the 
socio-ideological pole. As is the case with those who ideologically embrace the new framing, 
this group is likely to be impermeable to rational argument and slow to change position. As we 
have explained above, we do not regard the quadrants in Figure 10 as immutable orientations 
associated with personality traits of individuals, but rather positions that actors find themselves 
occupying in the dynamics between investment and detachment. Accordingly, the framework 
envisages that, in time, actors may and will move within and between quadrants, or shift to 
another technology altogether when new options and discourses become available. 
Analogously, we do not exclude sudden shifts between quadrants through radical conversion 
(Moscovici 1980). 
 
Actors who occupy the socio-ethical or politico-ethical poles are likely to be more open to the 
alternatives, and therefore identify with (or refrain from using) the technology in a more 
conditional way. Thus, we use the term ‘conditional buy-in’ to signal that such adhesion will be 
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subject to conditions, deliberation and material calculations. One may formulate the hypothesis, 
which will need to be empirically corroborated, that ethically-oriented identification (quadrant 
4) is more likely to lead to a sustainable, dynamic and innovative transformation that may be 
less ideologically self-invested. By contrast, we conjecture that ideologically-invested 
identifications are more likely to lead to frustration and disappointment in regards to their 
fantasmatic expectations. We must emphasize, however, that these two positions are not 
affect-free. For one thing, as we have seen, promoters of new technologies circulate specific 
discourses aimed at enrolling (or seducing) the occupants of these more ethically oriented 
positions. Simultaneously, in both cases actors accept being identified by the categories and 
grammar proposed by the new technology (programmer, modder, developer, indie, open 
person, etc.) This means that the working of fantasmatic logic mediates, but does not eliminate, 
the dialogue between ontic and ontological dimension, so that affect continues to play a central 
role in this process.  
 
Our tentative framework is of potentially real value not only for addressing affective motivations 
for embracing one technological framing over another, but also for understanding actors’ 
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various degrees of engagement towards such framings. A more effective integration of 
affective dynamics into the buy-in process enhances the level of achievable granularity, 
enabling a better appreciation of the phenomenon.  
 
This paper also advances conversations with, as well as within, other approaches to the study 
of affective politics in IS, including phenomenological, psychodynamic and Foucauldian 
orientations (Hirschhorn, 1988; Avgerou and McGrath, 2005; Brigham and Introna 2006). We 
have suggested, in fact, that affect cannot be treated in isolation and studied as a mode of 
being or a mental state of IS stakeholders. Rather, as outlined above, much is to be gained if 
we adopt a politically informed stance; accordingly, we consider affect both as the arena in 
which ideological conflicts between alternative paradigms are conducted, and the medium 
through which such conflicts are fought and temporarily resolved. As a result, our core focus 
on affective politics contributes to earlier discussions on why ‘social defenses’ (Wastell, 1996; 
1999) emerge (the ‘barrier’ of IS design and framing), or, contrastingly, why disruptive 
innovation happens to thrive so suddenly.  
 
Perhaps more fundamentally, we have also made the case that a Logics approach provides a 
useful analytical framework to connect the areas of affect, meaning-making and power 
relations. While earlier studies on performative framing and power have drawn on actor-
network theory (Walsham 1997; Monteiro 2000; Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014), the Logics 
framework allows us to reach beyond the empirically-visible ontic dimension, where power 
relations can be described as resulting from decisions and deliberation, in order to give explicit 
consideration to the less immediately-visible, affectively-mediated ontological dimension of 
practice. As we have seen above, this is the dimension where a platform’s owners and 
developers simply find themselves having a strong feeling for one technology rather than 
another, a feeling that they often verbalize with strong words and passionate expressions. Our 
main contribution to the literature addressing narratives and subjective interpretations (e.g. 
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Bartis and Mitev 2008; Fincham 2002) is thus to engage with fantasmatic logic, which explains 
why certain framings become suddenly excitable, gripping or repellent within a group. 
 
The Logics approach and the four quadrants framework are also useful in understanding and 
depicting the power relations that may potentially be obtained by mobilizing different forms of 
affective buy-in. Thus, this approach can help to make sense of the varying degrees of power 
exerted by stakeholders or promoters when implementing an information system (Boonstra et 
al. 2008; Pouloudi et al. 2016). While our framework holds similarities with the Foucauldian 
tradition (Silva and Backhouse, 2003; Avgerou and McGrath 2007), attending to the 
fantasmatic dimension enables us move beyond regulatory power, by capturing, and 
commenting upon, power’s emergent, pre-discursive, and affective dynamics. Deployment of 
the Logics, in particular, suggests that the relationship between affect and technology framing 
cannot simply be reduced to a linear cause-effect matter. For one thing, as we have seen, 
attempts to promote affective identification with a specific practice can have different and 
potentially opposing outcomes. 
 
7 Conclusion 
Our paper has engaged not only theoretically but also epistemologically and empirically with 
the notion of affective politics in the context of technology framing and buy-in. Acknowledging 
that the process through which people consent to the framing of (the nature) of technology has 
been little understood, our core contribution has thus been to introduce social, political and 
fantasmatic logics to the IS literature in order to develop a more granular understanding of 
technology framing and buy-in. We contribute specifically to the technology framing literature 
– especially the socio-cognitive and socio-political areas – by showing that collective meaning-
making always emerges out of an antagonism which impels social actors and interest groups 
to position themselves according to four poles: this process is inescapably political and, 
relatedly, fundamentally inter-subjective and collective. In the paper, we offer a framework that 
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helps to identify four ideal-positions that result from the dynamic between these poles and 
exemplify them systematically utilizing examples from our empirical study of Unity 3D.  
 
We contribute to the existing literature on technology framing in a number of ways. First, we 
propose a politico-affective understanding of framing incongruence that complements and 
integrates with the prevailing socio-cognitive view. Our argument is that affective politics is 
constitutively involved in the construction of, negotiation of, and buying-in to, such framing. At 
the same time, conflict and incongruence between framing is experienced affectively as a 
threat to self-identification and leads to responses that are partially emotionally driven (and so 
apparently ‘irrational’). Second, our paper integrates the performative view of framing 
suggesting that the politicization of “meaning power” is often, and possibly always underpinned 
by, the attempt to mobilize both reason and affect. While interests, pursuit of legitimation and 
search for material returns remain central motivators in the framing of technology, one should 
not discount the power of seduction and enrolment through invocation of affective associations 
with specific discourses (in our case, discourse of community, heroism and anti-
establishment). Third, our framework problematizes the tacit assumption of uniformity and 
consensus which underpins much of the existing discussion of framing as group or 
occupational related phenomena. 
 
Our approach and framework, as exemplified in Figure 10, suggests that a plurality of positions 
exist within what authors have often characterized as homogenous groups. The framework 
also makes room for movement, transitions and compromises, providing a much more 
nuanced and realistic vista on the political dynamics of technology framing. One of the 
strengths of our framework is that the focus is not on psychological individuals: the framework 
identifies modes of engagement and positions, not individual emotional reactions: the 
framework thus operates at psychosocial, rather than psychological level. At this level, 
technological frames are not ‘done deals’ and their grip depends in part on the extent to which 
actors continue to self-identify with them. In line with the Essex tradition (Laclau 1993) the 
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framework shows that ‘agency’ is always a possibility that can emerge at the intersection 
between old and new discourses: in a few years, for example, John may find that people call 
him a ‘conservative’ for using Unity, which in turn may affect his allegiance to the whole 
ecosystem.  
 
Being speculative in character, our theory-building paper opens up a number of opportunities 
for future research. For reasons of space, we confine ourselves to listing the three more 
apparent routes. First, to our knowledge, this is the first attempt to utilize and develop the 
Logics approach in the IS discipline – in this case, focusing illustratively on design framing 
processes - however more work is necessary to fully exploit the affordances of this approach. 
For example, we have mobilized our Unity case alongside our theoretical exposition for 
explicitly explicatory purposes; much could be learned by conducting further empirical studies 
in different contexts and cases to shed light on the discursive manoeuvres – conscious or 
semi-conscious – used by technology designers and leaders, and the responses of those 
targeted. Future studies could also explore in more detail the types of discourse used and their 
effectiveness in inducing buy-in to the emerging technology. Second, our framework explicitly 
hypothesizes that positions will change over time and more work is necessary to examine this 
variation; in particular, longitudinal and historical case studies would enable us to deepen our 
understanding of the temporal dynamics of the Logics. 
 
Third, in the discussion part of the paper, we put forward a quadrant for conceptualizing actors’ 
orientations towards technological framing, a framework that requires further elaboration and 
needs to be corroborated. We suggest that our framework may offer a useful complement to 
emerging performative approaches within IS (Cecez-Kecmanovic et al. 2014), which seek to 
highlight the inherent indeterminacy of technology success and failure, and to address the 
‘agencies of assessment’ that perform IS realities over time. Whilst, for example, we welcome 
these authors’ efforts to expose the ‘ontological politics’ entailed in attempts to promote 
competing assessments of IS, such studies to date have largely omitted the affective 
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dimension through which such narratives are filtered before they can be performed in practice. 
Thus, recalling Kaplan (2008), a more sophisticated account of the mediating role of affect in 
the framing-adhesion process offers real promise in enhancing existing performative accounts 
when explaining why certain ideologies may be inherently more seductive and powerful for 
some people than for others, and why one frame may come to predominate over others. 
Finally, and crucially, we hope that others may take and use the Logics framework to enrich 
this and other practice-based perspectives on the framing, acceptance and 
implementation/adoption of IS. 
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Appendix 1. Details about secondary streams of the literature review 
 
Relevant 
Sections of the 
Review 
Research streams 
(and explanations) 
References 
The socio-politics 
of Framing 
The Irvine school of Social Informatics 
The incorporation of politics in the context of 
meaning-making has a long tradition within 
the IS literature and dates back more than 40 
years to, at least, the Irvine School in the late 
70s and 80s. This pioneering work brought to 
the fore the social dimensions of informatics. 
For instance, the Irvine school was 
concerned with the appropriation of IT by 
non-specialists, highlighting ideological 
assumptions and biases within the computer 
science community itself. ICT itself has been 
considered as an institutional actor and IS 
implementation as a process of design and 
institutionalization, which captures the value-
laden process through which struggles 
between various interest groups become 
embedded in the way things are done – often 
with lasting impact. 
Kraemer and Dutton, 
1979 
Danziger et al. 1982 
Kling and Iacono, 
1989 
Kling 1996 
Kling 2004 
 
 The Circuits-of-Power Framework  
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The socio-politics 
of Framing 
Group 
motivations 
Affective politics  
Institutionalization of IS is achieved when the 
system is no longer contested and therefore 
becomes routinized in the organization. From 
this perspective, power is not the capacity of 
an individual agent but results instead from the 
circulation of discourse and disciplinary 
techniques; it is fundamentally strategic, 
intentional and central in sustaining and 
conferring stability within social systems. For 
an information system to be institutionalized, it 
has to be integrated into three circuits of 
power: episodic (the “power over”, 
foregrounding the relations between those 
who promote the systems and those who 
resist), social (dispositional power including 
rules and norms, and their relationship to 
technology) and systemic (facilitative power: 
techniques used to ensure discipline and 
hegemony).  
 
Silva and Backhouse, 
2003 
Clegg, 1989 
 The IS literature on Affect/Emotion/Feeling  
Affective politics  While affect is arguably central to human 
motivation, it is still poorly understood 
theoretically. Its analysis is often complicated 
by the numerous synonyms of the notion in 
psychology and social sciences.  
Ashkanasy et al. 2017 
Beaudry and 
Pinsonneault 2005 
Ortiz de Guinea and 
Markus 2009 
Zhang 2013 
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The Logics framework explains the unfolding 
interplay between three key dimensions of 
psychosociality: ‘affect’ - subjects’ 
unconscious, pre-linguistic positioning and 
associated receptiveness to feelings 
(Massumi, 1987); ‘feelings’ – sensations 
resulting from subjects’ affectively-shaped 
interpreting and labelling of phenomena 
based on their own biographically-derived 
understandings of their situation; and 
collective ‘emotions’ – socially embedded, 
and socially experienced, displays of feelings. 
A common example of the social 
embeddedness of emotions would be the 
experience of shame. 
To recap, ‘affect’ relates to our unconscious 
and pre-linguistic receptiveness, and thus 
predispositions towards ideas or experiences; 
‘feelings’ are biographically-derived 
interpretations of our positioning in relation to 
these ideas/experiences; and ‘emotions’ are 
social performances that are collectively 
experienced“. 
Stein et al. 2015 
The Technology Acceptance Model  
Most of the published work in IS on emotions, 
including the vast TAM-related literature, 
relies on questionnaires and focuses on the 
Davis 1989 
Davis et al. 1989 
Davis et al., 1992 
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individual level and generally raises 
questions that are different from those we 
address in this paper.  
 
Agarwal and 
Karahanna 2000 
Venkatesh et al. 2012 
etc. 
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Appendix 2.. Details about the study on Unity 3D 
(generated September 2012-December 2013) 
 
Methods Source of data and activities 
Ethnography of Unity's annual Developer 
Conference, Unite 2013, in Vancouver 
Convention Centre. Sensitization to 
peoples’ affect and feelings was 
achieved via participant observation of 
speeches, parties and celebrations, as 
well as speaking with developers. 
 
Participant observation of numerous 
events, including game design meetings 
in two start-ups, a specialized research 
conference in the field of game design 
research in Bournemouth in the United 
Kingdom in 2013 
 
15 conferences, tutorials and workshops were 
attended, which included: ‘Unity Serious 
Games’ Showcase’; ‘Console to Mobile: 
Bringing AAA to mobile’; ‘Scripting behind the 
scene’; ‘Connect gamers cross platforms with 
Facebook’ and ‘Architectural Visualization with 
Unity: From Revit to Unity to Rift’ 
 
The observations were written up as 
ethnographic field notes & ethnographic 
memos. 
 
Netography of Unity’s online community 
of users, reflecting prior research on 
online communities in IS (Koh, et al. 
2007; Wilson and Peterson 2002; Zhang 
and Storck 2001; Vaast and Levina 
2015). 
To collect threads, the field researcher relied 
upon the search functions of the online fora for 
certain key words, such as ‘UDK’ (Unreal 
Development Kit), ‘Unreal’, ‘Unity’, ‘First-
person shooter’ and ‘RPG’ (Role-playing 
game). 
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The following conversation was examined in 
depth: ‘Is Unity any easier than UDK?’ We 
chose this *heated) exchange as it compares 
Unity’s framing with that of a competitor (UDK-
Unreal), and illustrates how developers 
position themselves in relation to two market-
leading game engines. Through Unity’s online 
community, participants obtain help and 
discuss solutions with experienced users of 
Unity. They share their knowledge of, and 
passion for, the topic. 
 
The online community’s sections encompass 
fora, answers, feedback, an issues tracker, 
and documentation, Unify Script, Tips Wiki and 
Unity Chat. These fora are the central hub of 
the community discussions. Game designers 
are invited to voice their opinion, display what 
they are working on and to evaluate the work 
others are doing. The fora are also an 
opportunity to network with other Unity 
developers if they need to build or expand their 
team. 
 
Interviewees as well as fora participants were 
anonymized. 
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A three-hour in-depth interview of Unity 
3D’s Director of its UK branch and the 
Director of Support and Communication 
was conducted at Unity’s office in 
Brighton in 2013. 
 
Unity’s support team aims at understanding 
the problems that customers have and 
ensuring that they receive technical solutions 
and attention from Unity’s developers if they 
find bugs. 
Documentary research on Unity 3D Recorded speeches, press and online 
interviews of the CEO David Helgason were 
analyzed, and documents as well as archival 
analysis were conducted (e. g. blog posts, 
white papers, websites and Unity’s marketing 
materials). 
 
The LinkedIn activities and announcements of 
the company were also followed. 
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